WHITE RACIAL NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
by Ronald Walters

THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION  
(EAFORD)
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*

The views expressed in this EAFORD Paper are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent an official position of The International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.


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White Racial Nationalism in the United States

Ronald Walters*

An inescapable feature of the past six years of the "Reagan Revolution" has been the extent to which the conservative ideology that fueled it has congealed into a nationalism in the United States, the breathtaking sweep of which has pervaded many aspects of domestic and foreign policy. Ultimately, it has affected the normative character of the American psyche and, thereby, influenced the quality of life and behavior within institutions and neighborhoods. Yet a search reveals few writers who have characterized this phenomenon in its nationalistic dimensions. Perhaps it is easier to see a domestic brand of nationalism when its proponents wield such slogans as "Black Power," causing a flood of articles about "Black nationalism" to pour out into the landscape as in the 1960s. However, when one is a part of a nationalistic syndrome, it is perhaps more difficult to reveal its manifestations, because people who ostensibly support civil rather than radical processes of social change may be reluctant to admit their support of it. In any case, one cannot understand many aspects of modern American political behavior without taking this resurgent nationalism into serious consideration.

The Reagan Administration has attempted to employ the current strain of U.S. nationalism, for example, to contribute to the viability of U.S. corporations in their struggle with foreign competition, and to destroy the restraints on private capital in an effort to make unbridled capitalism the engine of domestic growth. Moreover, the supporters of this nationalism have sounded a number of moral, social themes such as the preservation of the family, respect for law and order, anti-abortion, prayer in the schools, and others as a basis for restoring a pre-1960s social structure as the substance of “Americaness.” They have also attempted to repress public attention to and concern for the disadvantaged classes—Blacks, other minorities, women, and others, in order to restore white dominance of the social order through the resurrection of the status of white men.

It is instructive to note that the current wave of American nationalism is chauvinistic not only because it is American, but also because it is white. The domestic indication of this fact is that in attempting to resurrect the primacy of economics and military policy, the Reaganites have led the charge for the destruction of the national social agenda aimed at disadvantaged Blacks and others— including Black immigrants, such as the Haitians and Cubans. By posing the domestic dilemma as a problem of government hegemony which required “getting government off your back, to loose you and let you be independent again,” Ronald Reagan has shaped a vision of restructuring society, using the framework of a time which not only elevated the interest of the wealthy over the poor, but which also contained white hegemonic dominance. That is to say, whites were not only dominant in an objective sense, there was an explicit ideology and style of such racial dominance.

It has been unnecessary for those supporting the resurrection of white hegemonic dominance to shout “white power”! This crude manifestation of white nationalism has been left to the Ku Klux Klan, the Aryan Nations and other such groups. Writers such as Murray Edelman and others have identified a far more sophisticated process which occurs in the transmission of social values through public policy, either as a reflection of a pre-existing movement or as the will of an existing regime in power—or both.¹ Yet, the unmistakable symbolism that the arrival of radical white nationalism has pervaded the culture may be found in such patriotic sounding slogans as “America is back” and “born in America again,” slogans which have both foreign and domestic implications.

One of the central social issues which has recently arisen is the increase of incidents of racially motivated violence. Sensational stories, prompted by incidents of racial violence in the Howard Beach section of Queens, New York and a threatening KKK gathering in Forsythe County, Georgia, have posed the question of why the “resurgence of racism.”² This means that there has been, in addition to the usual patterns of racism, an apparent increase of incidents of white physical aggression against Blacks as a dynamic, highly-volatile component of racist conduct.

Why, people have asked, did a mob of whites chase and beat three Black men through Howard Beach until one was killed by an oncoming automobile on the night of 20 December 1986? Why has the Ku Klux Klan been emboldened to the point that it would confront a few hundred and then 20 thousand civil rights marchers in Forsythe County, Georgia? The rising tide of these sensational incidents of physical violence against Blacks by whites reminds us of an earlier
historical epoch. Yet, a court case brought by the Southern Poverty Law Center settled a Klan lynching in 1987 in Alabama; mobs of whites in southwest Philadelphia harassed a racially mixed couple who moved in in 1985; an elderly Black woman in Harlem, Mrs. Eleanor Bumpers, was shot to death by police in 1986, and several young Blacks have been killed in recent years by the use of police “choke-holds.”

The key to the causes of this social behavior lies deep in the post-World War II environment. White nationalism has festered as a reaction to the social movements and changing economic conditions which have provoked a modest amelioration of the social status of some disadvantaged non-whites and white women, relative to the normative status of white males.

Such conservative and reactionary movements have occurred before and have also carried a strong element of white chauvinism and anti-Black bias in the extreme. White supremacy is an ancient principle whereby those “Americans” who founded this republic—however much they may have differed among themselves on the question of colonialism—agreed as whites when it came to Blacks. One writer has said, “At the heart of Anglo-Saxonism lay the conviction that the Anglo-Saxon (British) race possessed a special capacity for governing itself (and others) through a constitutional system which combined liberty, justice and efficiency. It was a gift that could not be transferred to lesser peoples. . . .”

To illustrate this point, at the turn of the century when the Social Darwinists were busily justifying both the manifest destiny of America and the inferiority of other groups, the book, Our Country, by a minister, Josiah Strong, became very influential. This work, as did many others, championed the idea that the Anglo-Saxon was destined to rule the world. If white supremacy is dead, then shouldn’t the idea have seriously eroded that America should be ruled by whites, with non-white groups kept in a subordinate position in the social structure? And shouldn’t the enlightened view of American pluralism with all groups sharing political, economic and social power equitably have become the new norm of social practice? The history of current events would appear to speak more loudly in answer to this point, since the practice of racial equality has been dangerously detailed by whites who perceive (I would argue inaccurately) the threatened loss of their social status. This is a powerful motivating factor in generating a conservative ideology and social movement.

Therefore, I want to assert in this paper that the current political culture contains a pervasive strain of white nationalism as one of its dynamic features. The origin of this nationalism was the reaction to movements for social change by Blacks, other disadvantaged groups and youthful whites since World War II, which caused feelings of disempowerment by a segment of the white population devoted to the preservation of the status quo. White, conservative populists coalesced with other conservative elements into a nationalist movement dedicated to acquiring social and political power as the instruments of returning the United States to the status quo ante. At the grassroots level, this conservative movement led to the emergence of an authoritarian populism which facilitated the rise of racially-motivated violence. And at the national level, it provided the impetus for a coalition which elected Ronald Reagan to the presidency. One characterizes this
movement as "white" in the literal sense that there was a marked absence of substantial Black participation in its activities or support for its values. Moreover, Black progress itself has become one of the primary targets of this movement in the attempt by the Reagan Administration to rearticulate the racial problem in society in a way which subordinates Black and minority interests and restores and preserves white supremacy.

I. The Perceived Loss of White Power: The Sources of a Conservative Populist Ideology

To suggest that white power was ever surrendered (and therefore needed resurrecting) may appear confusing to many, especially since it is obvious that whites as a group have never lost status in America, a majority white country. However, there is within any society a "balance of attention" to certain issues in a given historical era which defines social power in a public way that both symbolizes and influences the extant distribution of benefit. This determines the relative material condition of groups, and shapes their psyche as well. Whereas sociologist Pitirim Sorokin suggests that the immediate cause of all extreme movements for social change has always been the sense of repression felt by one group, another sociologist, W. I. Thomas identifies "the wish for public recognition," as one of four specific causes.5

Whites, although the dominant socio-cultural group, are hardly homogeneous ideologically. In this context, the outcome of struggles for the distribution of benefit among groups of white Americans defines the national power equation existing within society relative to the dominant political formations of whites and the status of others—Blacks among them. To the extent that whites differ among themselves over issues, the political system can appear to alter the balance of power by the significance it gives to status and distributive issues. Black demands, on the other hand, have destabilized the system itself, having been portrayed as unsatisfiable. For example, the Civil Rights Movement appeared to favor Blacks in that the balance of attention focused on what Blacks considered to be the marginal alleviation of their grievances due to past oppression. To whites, however, it appeared to be a substantial change and, therefore, threatened a serious alteration in the status quo.

Of course, there was no better indication of the nature of the public balance of issues which defined the status of any group than those issues with which the national government was seized, since they became the focus of the public dialogue and concern. It was patently clear to any observer that, within the thirty-two years from 1932 to 1964, Blacks and the white blue-collar working class had begun to benefit from the interventionist policies of Democratic Party presidents, a pattern which could not even be broken by eight consecutive years of Republican administrations.

Isolating the white racial reaction is not difficult, since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas touched off a veritable storm which Martin Luther King, Jr. called a return to the "interposition
and nullification" postures of the 19th century states rightists. King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee and the other mainline civil rights organizations went on to campaign throughout the South, bringing the movement into the very heart of the old confederacy, and in the process threatening the status quo, both in that area and with the pressures it generated for the promulgation of national legislation.

Danzig notes, however, that the South's "massive resistance" campaign opposing the forward progress of Black civil rights was solidly in defense of the status quo, and that:

Ideological slogans such as 'states rights'... permit the segregationist to fight for his privileged position and, at the same time, to regard himself as a latter-day apostle of individual freedom against the tyranny of the state. In this way, he screens his attachment to a caste system by an image carved from the grain of American resistance to tyranny.6

Even among the Northern Republicans, the writer goes on to suggest that such issues as balancing the budget were not so much championed because they made good economic sense, but because they also were consistent with an ethnic/racial Protestant religious code of personal responsibility, a fact which brought welfare policies under condemnation. Thus, the policy issues were interpreted through the nativist tone of moral values, which established an easy connection with fundamentalist religious sentiments. Nevertheless, a prominent Episcopal minister perceived that the church would become split by those who welcomed change from the basis of a "Christian social conscience" and those seeking to maintain privilege. He asserted that the latter group was attempting "to reassert a past dominance which would deny equal status to others."7

Thus, it may be that, for neo-conservatists such as writer Clyde Wilson,8 "well-being" for whites may also have to contain the public assurance that, relative to other groups in society, they are firmly in charge and have not lost—and are not in danger of losing—status due to public policies such as school or neighborhood integration, affirmative action, Black business mobility or political control.

There is some evidence for this view in the studies of Black and white attitudes in the late 1960s by Cataldo, Johnson and Kellstedt, who used the "self striving scale" to determine where a group felt it stood on the ladder of life. Strikingly, while whites felt that, in the past, the system met their highest aspirations, more so than Blacks (51% to 4%), Blacks had more confidence than whites that the system was meeting their aspirations in the present (45% to 42%). Future projections for both groups were nearly equally optimistic (59%—whites; 60%—Blacks).9 Also, data from the University of Michigan's National Election Study confirm this trend as characterized by an increase in political efficacy by Conservatives and a corresponding decrease for Liberals precisely at the time when the white populist movement was maturing.10

When one looks at any graph of average family income in the 1960s, it is remarkable how steadily upward the trend lines appear, leading to the conclusion that as long as the personal fortunes of many middle and upper-class whites were
Table 1: Perception of Internal Political Efficacy by Liberals and Conservatives 1964-1976
(percent different index)

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<th>1964</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1976</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


secure, they were willing to tolerate funding the human rights program of the Great Society. However, those fortunes began to fall in the early 1970s, as the rate of growth in American productivity sank and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1975 began to foment economic instability through high rates of unemployment in the critical energy sector and rising prices of many related goods. In addition, as George Gilder has observed: "The American upper classes... underwent another 'great depression'," as wealth was redistributed by an unbearable rate of inflation.11

This "greening" of the white middle and upper classes in the direction of tighter economic, conservative and individualist notions of opportunity and progress drove them in the direction of the philosophical New Right and the anti-government populism. At the very least, it made them ripe for reconsidering the entire panoply of government assistance programs to the disadvantaged, especially where they were funded by traditional Democratic-style strategies of taxation. The result was that some were made skeptical and others hostile to affirmative action programs which appeared to provide a federally sponsored mechanism for enhancing the devolution in their social status in comparison with that of Blacks and others. Senator Paul Laxalt, (R-AZ), a confidant of President Reagan who believes affirmative action to be unconstitutional, compounded this extremity with the suggestion that some members of the Supreme Court who affirmed the principle of affirmative action in the Weber case (1979)12 did not expect their own children to work at craft jobs in Louisiana oil refineries. He continued:

But the majority of Americans want and need those jobs, and white collar equivalents. They don't want to see Blacks or anybody else excluded from all the possibility that America has to offer. At the same time, they don't want or deserve to be confined into an ever-narrowing area of opportunity themselves.13

Thus, the competition and resulting social conflict over an ever-tightening job market contributed to heightening tensions over the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement policies such as Title VII of the 1964 Act.14

The revolt of Southern populist conservatives over civil rights and the economic conservatism of the early-1970s, together with the patriotic counter-reaction to the anti-Vietnam War movement, all made possible what Oni and Winant have called the convergence of the New Right with conservative populism to produce an anti-statist, "authoritarian populism."15 Since Democrats had been in charge of running the state, the dissatisfaction with the course of the nation came to be lodged at the presidential level of government. Public opinion between
1964 and 1978, for example, exhibited a clear shift in direction toward a negative view of the power of the federal government as the tables below will show. The table below shows historical differences which suggest a government has become too strong and that, while Blacks agree with this somewhat, this concept is more strongly held by whites. One source of this alienation is the issue of busing. In fact, one New Right spokesman says: “nothing has contributed more to white populist disillusionment than the breathtaking hypocrisy and condescending arrogance shown by the establishment over the race issue.” Citing the activities of some liberal politicians on the issue of busing as a key to this attitude, he continues: “No wonder vast numbers of white working-class Americans have come to believe that the federal government holds them and their children in something approaching contempt.”

Table 2: Attitudes toward the Power of the Federal Government, 1964-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1978</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too strong</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not too powerful</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, there is some empirical support for the proposition that, in the critical period since the Civil Rights Movement, the white population grew increasingly restive over the various solutions utilized to bring about equality among the races. The goal was to reacquire national political authority in an effort to use government as the instrument for directing basic changes in critical sectors of the society.

II. The White Conservative Populist Political Insurgency

The first substantial white reaction to the attention given by the Democrats to Blacks began in the period 1944-1948, when Blacks became nominal partners in the party coalition. The Supreme Court overturned the White Primary in 1944 and the resulting increase in the voting power of Blacks caused the Democrats, in 1948 at their National Convention, to adopt platform planks favoring civil rights and fair employment practices. At this signal of the changing balance of attention, Senator Strom Thurmond (D-SC) bolted the Democratic Party and ran for president on the Dixiecrat Party ticket.

This largely symbolic protest marked the important defection of a significant portion of the white South from the party, which has since given only Lyndon Johnson the majority of its vote to a Democratic presidential candidate. The
Johnson landslide in 1964 buried Senator Barry Goldwater, whose highly ideological campaign, perhaps, signaled the emergence of the radical right in an attempt to define a conservative reaction to the essential direction of the country. As one writer has noted, however, even polls in 1964 were showing high levels of voter support for such issues as prayer in schools, claims of governmental laxity in national security, trimming the federal government, welfare and relief programs having a demoralizing effect on beneficiaries, and that federal right-to-work laws should be enacted. Also, in the wake of Goldwater’s loss, fair housing laws that had recently been passed were repealed in the state of California and in cities such as Akron, Ohio. In part, this was testimony to the growing ideological appeal of Goldwater conservatism, major strains of which were directed against Blacks and other beneficiaries of federal government intervention.

From the description of the Goldwater/Johnson election, it is clear that there was the slow development of a political coalition, both in the North and South, largely among whites with vested interests in at least restoring the status quo ante the Civil Rights Movement. Some wanted to eliminate the entire thrust of Democratic Party public policy beginning with the New Deal; however, a much more powerful stimulus would be needed. As is now well known, the first major Black rebellion occurred in Birmingham, Alabama in 1964 as an outgrowth of the non-violent civil rights activity of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. But this movement which had been taken into the depths of the old Confederacy—provoking Governor George Wallace to stand in the school house door to prevent Autherine Lucy from desegregating the University of Alabama, and to declare “Segregation today, segregation tomorrow and segregation forever . . .”—caused an even greater backlash by whites against the federal government.

The quest for state power by the New Right and conservative populist South was still unable to coalesce by 1968, when George Wallace arrived on the scene to lead the American Independence Party (AIP) in its own strategy of launching a presidential candidacy that would impact upon the Democratic Party and give the election to Richard Nixon. Speaking in the language of southerners and blue-collar northern whites, he propounded the anti-statist and coded-racist doctrine that the source of their problems were northern federal government bureaucrats and “pointy-headed liberals.” Although he did surprisingly well in the South, attracting 30% of the vote and 13.5% in all regions, it was a margin which apparently helped to benefit Richard Nixon. Thus, while Nixon won a narrow victory in 1968 (43.4% to 42.7%), by 1972 his landslide signaled the fusion of the cross-over Wallace white constituency, together with a more conservative group of northern white, middle-class, Republican voters. For, whereas in 1968 the Republicans gained 43.4% and the AIP had 13.5%, in 1972 the Republican Party landslide vote was 60.7% of the electorate, or the combined vote of the two parties.

Between 1968 and 1972, the radical faction made overtures to the Republican Party coalition, but was not strong enough to determine its course. In fact, Nixon attempted to appeal to this constituency without yielding to its political influence. Thus, he began dismantling the funding for Johnson’s “War on Poverty” (which had only been instituted three years earlier) and other aspects of the Great Society program. At the same time, he instituted a liberal Republican version of Black
economic opportunity in the concept of "set-asides" for minority businesses. It should be noted that in this period a Black legislator, Edward Brooke, was in the U.S. Senate, and a phalanx of moderate Black Republicans who shared most of the mainstream Black agenda had been appointed to key posts in the Nixon Administration. This group exercised a slight moderating influence on the racial policies of the Nixon era.

The radical white element joined the conservative Republican coalition in 1972, but it would not gain ascendency within the Republican party until the Reagan election of 1980. It then achieved state power and the ability to go far beyond the Nixon mandate into a serious struggle to eliminate the legislative basis for the status of newly ascendant groups, such as Blacks, and to restore the values of the social structure which made whites able to exercise hegemonic power. Within this coalition, the southern white element has become important as the swing vote, moderating the presidential electoral fortunes of the Republican and Democratic party candidates. As we have seen, it has been largely responsible for initiating the return to power of the Republican Party, and, provided that Blacks remain in the Democratic column, it could elect a Democrat president as well. This position as a swing vote has set up competition for white southern votes and also influenced public policy in their direction to some extent as well.

III. The Surge of Populist White Nationalism

In the studies of revolutionary social processes by Crane Brinton, he refers to a stage in the process as "reign of terror" by the radicals who carry the torch of their particular conception of change, and who light the fires to consume the existing icons of social convention maintained by their enemies. There was such a reign of terror which has accompanied the "Reagan Revolution," the initial period of which was the late 1970s and early 1980s, a phenomenon which has extended to the present.

Robert Hoy cites a 1975 Gallup Poll showing that, by 1975, the extent of the alienation of the white working class had reached such proportions that "roughly one-third of white Americans feel that violence against the federal government will eventually prove necessary to save 'our true American way of life,'" and that "these people, who love America because they are America" feel "betrayed by a system they see as growing more alien." Then in 1976, Professor Donald Warren identified Middle American Radicals (MARs) as constituting 31% of the white American population. In agreement with George Wallace, MARs identified the government, the president, radicals and big business as enemies of the traditional American values. This group exercised some influence on the racial policies of the Nixon era, though not as much as they would under Reagan.

Intellectual justification proceeded to fuel this movement as several other works of consequence emerged in 1975, such as Robert Whitaker's A Plague on Both Your Houses, (Robert B. Luce, 1975) and William Rusher's The Making of the New Majority Party (Green Hill, 1975). The concepts these authors espoused helped to legitimize the growth of white populist conservatism. For example, the Populist
Forum worked to turn a dispute launched by Concerned Citizens of Kanawha County, West Virginia over textbooks into a march on Washington which drew five thousand people. This group was later augmented by such anti-busing organizations as Boston’s Restore Our Alienated Rights (ROAR) and Union Labor Against Busing (ULAB) in Louisville, Kentucky, which organized 15 thousand people into a similar march. The movement began to build at the grassroots, and the mood of alienation which it embodied often stimulated acts of physical violence against Blacks, minorities and religious groups.

The Resurgence of the Klan

In addition to these populist stirrings, the orthodox white nationalist came to life in semi-rehabilitated form, as some officials of the Ku Klux Klan began to shed their white robes for three-piece suits to run for election. An example was Tom Metzger, grand dragon of the California Klan, who won the 1980 Democratic Congressional primary, with 13% of the vote, however, in a heavily Republican district. Also, a self-described Nazi won 43% of the vote in the Republican primary for Lieutenant Governor of North Carolina, having been defeated by Beverly Lake, who later lost to the popular Jim Hunt in a heavily Democratic state. In addition, “neo-Nazi” Gerald Carlson actually won the 15th Congressional District Primary of Michigan, although voters were not completely aware of his affiliation. When Carlson ran again in the 4th District—which differed from the 15th only in that it contained fewer white collar and foreign residents — and declared his Nazi affiliation, he only attracted 2% of the vote. These votes in themselves, including the Lyndon Larouche associates who won elections for state offices in the 1986 Illinois Democratic Party primary, have exposed the vulnerabilities of the electorate to an increasingly impersonal electoral system. They also may be indicative of the conservative ideological sentiment of many voters.

In any case, outbreaks of violence by the old Klan abated somewhat in the early 1970s, then rose again in the mid-to-late 1970s. Official Justice Department figures show, for example, that cases involving the Klan substantially increased in this period, as we shall see below. As is customary of political movements, this period of the late 1970s was marked by the rapid growth and reorganization of highly ideological, leading-edge, orthodox, white, nationalist groups such as the White Patriot Party of North Carolina, the Posse Comitatus, and the Aryan Nations Church, which was started in the late 1970s to “eliminate the members of the Jewish faith and the Black race from society.” Linkages were found to exist among the KKK and the various Neo-Nazi groups at the World Aryan Congress in July of 1986 involving such groups as The Order, the National States Rights Party, the White Patriot Party, the Aryan Student Union, etc. This fact suggests their consolidation in an earlier period. This grouping is all the more serious since its tactics apparently involve the use of criminal methods (such as bank robberies, break-ins at U.S. military bases and other weapons storage areas) in order to obtain large amounts of cash and weapons with which to train members for the violent overthrow of the United States and establishment of a white nation.
As one writer said, in 1975 the Klan:

...began popping up like crabgrass: throwing its hood into the vice presidential race; infiltrating the Marine Corps; protesting busing in Boston and Louisville; joining textbook fights in Charleston, West Virginia; creating a scandal in New York state prison system; prompting the Illinois legislature to conduct a major investigation; burning crosses from California to Maryland; going to court to sue and be sued; and appearing on national talk shows.28

Nevertheless, these orthodox white nationalists have been under attack by the state, and even though they represent a minor threat to it, they constitute a major problem for minority groups. Thus, individuals such as Tom Metzger have been charged with involvement in cross-burnings in California, others have been indicted or jailed. And in February 1987, a Federal court in Mobile awarded a $7 million judgment against the United Klans of America in a 1981 lynching of Michael Donald, a 19-year-old Black youth.29

In addition, just as Klan activity was but the tip of the iceberg which uncovered white nationalist sentiments in Canada, Klan activity in the United States was growing throughout the nation, as witnessed by what was occurring on college campuses. Black students at Harvard in 1980 were subject to the appearance of racist graffiti in a pattern which its Dean of Students Archie C. Epps III condemned as “outrageous” and suggested that it appeared to be part of a national trend. Reports of similar incidents seemed to confirm his view, as cross-burnings occurred at Purdue University and Williams College in 1981, and anonymous threats and racial slurs were aimed at Black students at Wesleyan University, Cornell University and others.30

Small wonder that, by 1986, university officials and civil rights leaders would become worried by the wide-spread pattern of incidents, such as fist fights between Black and white students at the University of Massachusetts after a World Series game; threats against Blacks by a group of Aryan colleagues at the University of Texas; cross-burnings in front of a Black sorority house at the University of Alabama (Tuscaloosa); harassment of Black women by white men at Mount Holyoke College and the University of Massachusetts; harassment of a Black student at the Citadel military academy in Charleston, South Carolina; and racial tension over South Africa and other issues at Brown University, Dartmouth, the University of Pennsylvania and many others.31

Diffusion of Racist Violence

In fact, the Ku Klux Klan has been the most visible manifestation of a trend toward racial harassment and violence which has had wide participation by other whites. For example, statistics from the Montgomery County (Maryland) Human Relations Division show that, whereas there were only thirteen reported incidents of “Hate/Violence Incidents” in the County in 1979 directed against all groups, by 1980 there were twenty-five, a 100% increase. Most striking is the fact that incidents against Jews and Blacks continued to increase markedly over the
following three years. For Jews, violent incidents increased from thirty-eight in 1981, to ninety-five the next year. This leveled off to forty-eight in 1983. Hate/violence directed at Blacks increased from thirty-four incidents in 1981 to fifty-six in 1982, and totalled fifty-three in 1983.  

Table 3: Racially motivated Violence in Montgomery County, Maryland (1981-1983)

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<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>101</td>
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The dramatic rise of incidents in Montgomery County from a total of thirteen in 1979 to 185 for all groups by 1982—stabilizing after 1983—is not an anomalous figure from a national standpoint, as data in the report referred to above included statistics from the Anti-Defamation League which indicate that anti-Semitic incidents nationwide showed a 200% increase between 1979 and 1980 to 377 incidents. Incidents for Blacks and Jews tend to have a similar pattern of increase, although the rate is higher in affluent Montgomery County for the Jewish population, because it is double that of the Black population. Similar increases are also occurring in other cities as recent data from New York City’s Human Rights Commission show that, in 1984, there were 245 racial assaults; 298 in 1985; and 253 in 1986, 76 of these occurring after the incident at Howard Beach.

There is a similar pattern discovered in data from the state of California, as the Task Force on Racial, Ethnic and Religious Violence, established by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., issued its report in 1982, shortly before he left office. These data show generally an 80% increase in such cases in 1980 over the 1979 level, and a 42% increase in 1981 over 1980 cases, with the distribution of such increases generally reflected in the occurrence of a similar pattern in all five cities cited in the California report. Because of the demography of the state of California, these cases reflect incidents affecting groups such as Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians. And while there is some manifestation of inner-group tension among them, the predominant

Table 4: Racial/Ethnic Confrontation Alerts, 1977-1982

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All cases</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>1,548</td>
<td>1,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increase</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>(462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klan cases</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>(462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadly force</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

number of incidents occurs between these groups and whites, with the substantial involvement of police and Klan-type groups.

With respect to national trends in racially motivated violence, Justice Department data show a 450% increase of incidents of racial violence attributed to the Klan between 1978 and 1979, and a 550% increase in the period 1978-1980. Considering the fact that, from all sources, incidents of racially motivated violence increased by 42% between 1985 and 1986 with a smaller percent attributed to Klan-type groups, this is an indication that the phenomenon was diffusing into the general population.34

The large increases between 1977 and 1978 conform to the perspective of this paper, that a white nationalist, populist attitude within neighborhoods was responsible for the generation of violence. This point is supported by the Justice Department’s 1980 Report:

A factor for much of the racial and ethnic hostility was the perception by many White Americans that minorities, mainly Blacks and Hispanics, were getting a better deal than anyone else, and that attention and continued effort to bring them into the mainstream threatened their welfare. Minorities, on the other hand, perceived a creeping indifference and decreasing emphasis on efforts to improve their plight, and cited as justification an increasing number of reverse discrimination suits and charges, and a marked resurgence in the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. (Emphasis added.)35

There is other empirical evidence which supports this point of view in surveys taken in 1978 and 1981. In 1978, two years after major Black revolts abated that had destroyed parts of northern and mid-western cities, a replication of the 1968 Kerner Commission survey in those areas revealed that 10% fewer whites (1968, 39%; 1978, 49%) thought that Blacks were missing out on employment and promotions because of racial discrimination.36 By 1981, the ABC/Washington Post Poll revealed that 65% of whites disagreed with the statement that Blacks were discriminated against in securing managerial jobs, and there was strong disagreement (71%) that Blacks should receive assistance from the government “that white people in similar circumstances don’t get” because of past discrimination.37

Second, the figures for the increases in Klan activity which began to be recorded in 1979 showed increases by 1983 of 959%. However, as previously suggested, the phenomenon had begun to generalize and was no longer within the specific purview of the Klan and closely associated groups, as such incidents increased 39% over 1982. In any case, the 1983 Report all but suggests that the growth rate was difficult to control when it says: “The second priority, the containment and reduction of racial harassment acknowledges a growing segment of the Community Relations Service (CRS) caseload: the harassment, intimidation, and assault of minorities by the Ku Klux Klan, Nazi Party, and other groups.”38

Police Use of Deadly Force

Finally, because of the often close relationship between the local police forces and fascist or Klan-type organizations and activities historically, especially in the
South, police officers are often suspected to exercise deadly force against Blacks in a manner which highly suggests racial motivation. Whereas, in the early 1980s, the growth of the General Community Service category constituted the majority of CRS cases, in the late 1970s, Administration of Justice (police-community relations conflict) cases were the greatest part of its workload. For example, the 1978 CRS Report says that complaints of deadly force against Blacks and Hispanics increased by 50% over the 1977 level. The reports are not broken down by race. Nevertheless, figures from the Police Foundation for 1978 indicate that 78% of those killed and 80% of those non-fatally shot by police were minorities (and most of these were Black). By 1979, the law enforcement caseload was 40% of the total, and the growth in the cases of deadly force in particular inspired the statement that policemen had “one trigger finger for minorities and another for whites.” Such a sentiment was not without foundation, since the incidents of deadly force grew steadily in the early 1980s with the 1983 figure amounting to 413, or a striking 43% increase over the 1982 figure. Such cases of police shootings further inflamed Blacks because prosecutions were rarely brought against the officers involved.

The only factors which appeared to restrain the growth of such official, racially motivated violence was not the criminal justice system itself, but the election of sensitive Black mayors who initiated new policies for the use of deadly force. For example, after the election of both Coleman Young of Detroit, in 1973, and Maynard Jackson in Atlanta, in 1975, there were significant reductions in the cases of police use of deadly force there.

So numerous were the killings of Blacks from all sources in the late 1970s, especially in an atmosphere of a resurgence of Klan violence, that Black leaders contacted the Justice Department to complain of a possible national conspiracy. During 1980, eleven Black children in Atlanta, Georgia were murdered, eight Black men were killed in Buffalo, New York (amid Klan cross burnings), and others were killed by the police, causing Black leaders such as Reverend Herbert Daughtry, head of the National Black United Front, to hold “National Hearings on Racist Violence Against Blacks,” in February of 1981. In general, it can be concluded that Blacks were suffering harassment, injury and deaths from a number of sources, both official and non-official, in the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s at an increasing rate. The pattern seems to suggest that this fact was related to the increasingly bellicose arrival of the white populist conservative movement which was spearheaded by Klan-Nazi grouping, legitimized to some extent by neo-conservative and conservative intellectuals and diffused into the general population. The real legitimacy would come when the movement seized state power, as is argued below, through its role in facilitating the election of Ronald Reagan.

IV. Legitimizing White Nationalism

Given the strong support for the thesis that the rise of white nationalist populism occurred in the mid-1970s and grew stronger by the end of the five-year
period, there is also support for the notion that this was a movement which had two important effects. The first effect is that Blacks began to respond to the growing evidence of racism in their daily lives by increasing the volume of official complaints. The second was that Ronald Reagan was elected President.

**Black Complaints**

What may be said to have produced the first effect was the juxtaposition of two movements within the body politic. The militant Black nationalist phase of the Black liberation movement was just winding down in the mid-1970s, amid the signs that it was to have some salutary effect. For example, a significant Black middle class was being produced through progress in education and employment, and this led in turn to other aspects of social mobility such as suburbanization. At the same time, these gains were under attack by the surging white nationalist movement which had not yet attained state power. The conflict led Blacks to be sensitive to the “stiffening” social environment which began, as we have seen from the polls above, to raise questions about both the sufficiency and method of Black progress.47

Within the Title VII category of cases handled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), there are such subcategories as race, sex, color, religion, and national origin. Here one observes the categories which heavily involve Blacks charging discrimination based on race and color. The combined data for these two subcategories show that there was a similar increase in such new complaints in the years between 1978 and 1983, with sharp upsurges in the critical 1979-1980 period at the height of the white populist movement and the 1982-83 period of the Reagan recession. The “Total” figures are essentially evidence of the total number of all Title VII complaints, including the annual backlog, while the “New” figures are annual increases. In general, these complaints of employment discrimination have continued to grow as total Title VII charges to EEOC and the State and Localities together were 122 thousand in FY 1986, a 35% increase from the 79,868 the agency received in FY 1980.48

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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>47,587</td>
<td>38,236</td>
<td>39,724</td>
<td>45,759</td>
<td>45,367</td>
<td>42,686</td>
<td>50,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86,029</td>
<td>54,800</td>
<td>55,518</td>
<td>74,141</td>
<td>78,441</td>
<td>72,358</td>
<td>85,384</td>
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Added evidence that the neighborhoods in America are becoming a racial battleground is the fact that whites are increasing their resistance to Black movement into certain metropolitan area neighborhoods. It is well known that attendant to nationalist sentiments is a certain feature of “territoriality” wherein the group which believes that it “owns” or desires a piece of land will attempt to defend it from “outsiders,” and in some cases attempt to expand their territorial
base. Of course, the question of land ownership within a highly urbanized country such as the United States often bears an ambiguous relationship to ethnic or racial residential boundaries, since the economics of urban land distributes ownership to many outside of the neighborhood. Still, neighborhood turf is a “real” nationalist resource to those who live in certain areas, especially where there is an established ethnic or racial residential base involved over a long period of time which may be perceived to be threatened by “outsiders” moving in, and especially if the “outsider” is of a different race.

The 1980 census figures revealed the beginnings of a significant pattern of Black suburbanization, especially in such major metropolitan areas as Washington, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, New York, and Cleveland. Although the Black suburban population only constitutes 6% of the entire Black metropolitan residence nationally, this population grew by 43% between 1970 and 1980.49

Perhaps, then, the small size of this population suggests why it is less well known that Blacks are increasingly facing violence in attempting to move into such neighborhoods. A study by the Southern Poverty Law Center indicates, for example, that between 1985 and 1986, at least forty-five such incidents of violence against Blacks were related to “move-in” situations. Some of the more publicized incidents included one in southwest Philadelphia in November of 1985, when a Black couple and an interracial couple simultaneously moved into the Elwood neighborhood. A hostile mob of four hundred whites demonstrated in front of their homes, throwing bricks and bottles and shouting racial slurs in a scene which was repeated in March of 1986, in front of the home of an Asian family.50

In addition, data from the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Housing and Urban Affairs Department indicate that general complaints of housing discrimination have continued to rise in the period of the Reagan Administration. Again, this may help to account for the diffusion factor, as the general atmosphere continued to change in a direction which provided greater tendency for such incidents to occur.

**Taking Power**

The second factor in response to the white nationalist movement was that it provided a solidity to the political coalition inside the Republican Party that made it possible for Ronald Reagan to seize control of its conservative wing and win the party presidential nomination. It should be recalled that, when Reagan first ran for President in 1976, he lost the Republican nomination to Gerald Ford, a sign that the movement had not yet achieved dominance within the Party. By 1980, however, Reagan had so successfully played upon the theme of Democratic Party “appeasement” in “losing the Panama Canal” to “a tinhorn dictator,” that Jimmy Carter’s Iran hostage crisis played right into his hands. This theme, together with the rising crescendo of attacks by the neo-conservative side of the coalition on civil rights-coded issues such as affirmative action and busing, and the “vulnerability” of the U.S. to Soviet military blackmail due to the erosion in defensive capability, all made him electable.51
Thus, it is a fact that the white nationalist movement was cresting in the late 1970s and that Reagan was able to find the right symbols to unlock its electoral power which accounted for his election, not—as commonly suggested—that the charisma of Reagan alone was responsible. This powerful white nationalist movement did what other successful movements have done, according to Professors Omi and Winant:

Racial movements, built on the terrain of civil society, necessarily confront the state as they begin to upset the unstable equilibrium of the racial order. Once an oppositional racial ideology has been articulated, it becomes possible to demand reform of state racial policies and institutions.52

They go on to suggest that “the far right attempts to develop a new white identity, to reassert the very meaning of whiteness, challenges of the 1960s.”53 Thus, in posing the question of what were the residual rights of white people in reaction to the demands for Black rights, the ideology of “white rights” developed. The strategy of achieving full fruition of white rights, however, required the advancement of racial politics which would overturn not just the “gains” of the 1960s for Blacks, but the racial frame of reference as well. Hence, it was to rearticulate the very notion of racial inequality in a way which did not continue to threaten white interests.

Inasmuch as the white populist movement did not have the proper voice for this task of rearticulating race, it was left to the conservative and neo-conservative intellectuals. And without a full discussion of them here, from Kevin Phillip’s *The Emerging Republic Majority* to George Gilder’s *Wealth and Poverty*, there emerged an economic policy with a socio-political rationale which made possible an attack on “Big Government” as the catch-all synonym for their perceived racial problems, the moral decay of society and the needs of the defense establishment. In short, a new ideology of “Americanism” developed which made whiteness and its political interests the core definition, such that the patriotic symbols which suggested that “America is back” has a loaded meaning that relates to both foreign and domestic objectives of the new white political culture.

Between 1979 and 1982, a series of works were published proposing “limits” on the ability of government to participate broadly in the development of public goods for the amelioration of social conditions, which anticipated the coming of the Reagan reign. One such work was *Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence*, by Willard Gaylin, Ira Glasser, Steven Marcus and David Rothman, wherein the authors leveled a withering attack on the liberal society. They suggest that it had become a *parent* in its paternalistic approach to government’s attempt to provide social services for the disadvantaged; and they further argue that such social engineering ignored the often negative consequences of government intervention.54 Tellingly, Rothman viewed the service-providing liberals as contributing to government’s “power to expand itself and establish *dominion* over people’s lives.” (Emphasis added.)55

The defection of former liberals such as Irving Kristol, Seymour Martin Lipset, Norman Podhoretz, Carl Gershman, Midge Decter, Sidney Hook and others to the
role of neo-conservative apologists for the new white political culture lent a certain intellectual respectability to the movement. Indeed, while rejecting the notion that neo-conservatism was either a movement or that it was racist in character, Kristol acknowledged that the sources which shaped it were: “the campus revolts of the 1960s, the rise of the counterculture, the Great Society programs which many of us felt were misconceived, the reform of the Democratic Party and the takeover by the McGovernite wing, [and] the immense growth of Government regulation.” Is it purely accidental that Kristol objects to these enumerated political, economic and social forces and that they were also instrumental in helping to provide a platform for Black advancement? Such an accident is doubtful, since many of these individuals are also leading Jewish intellectuals and, in 1981, the American Jewish Congress appeared to have joined the conservative movement by calling upon President-elect Ronald Reagan to abolish “‘abuses’ in ‘race-conscious’ federal affirmative action programs.” In effect, did Kristol, like others perhaps, perceive a “zero-sum” situation to exist with respect to the distribution of attention between Jewish groups and Blacks? In any case, the emerging coherence and impact of this intellectual force in the mid-1970s helps to explain why public policy under Jimmy Carter did not “feel” like the traditional policies of a Democratic president to Blacks.

In fact, Blacks were acutely aware that the first significant cuts in the social side of the national budget were made in the last years of the Carter Administration. Indeed, so many other manifestations confirmed the conservative nature of Carter’s administration that one local leader, interviewed in a special feature of The New York Times on the Black mood, summed it up by observing what others had been saying:

Today the coalitions that were so successful in the 1960s are falling apart, partly because civil rights has moved off the national agenda. Vernon Jordan correctly described the new negativism: Because of the illusion of black progress, white people no longer feel that programs should be directly targeted toward black people.”

Nevertheless, in the transition from Carter to Reagan social policies would experience an even more abrupt and radical downward slide in profile and substance as the conservative movement assumed power.

The victory of the radical Republicans in 1980 meant that they could implement a broad agenda of concerns in line with their ideology, if one takes seriously the formulation of mandates issued forth from the Heritage Foundation and other far right think tanks. Among the subjects for urgent attention was a broad-scale attack upon the political and economic foundations of the civil rights revolution of the 1960s. Why? There were many reasons given which ranged from the philosophical concern with the reconstruction of individual rights over corporate—or group—rights, and analyses which purported to show that the social programs which supposedly assisted the disadvantaged in a wide range of areas were dysfunctional. As suggested, none of these rationales were a persuasive pretext for whites to restore what they consider to be the balance of hegemony in the national interests, both domestic and foreign. After the long travail of the white nationalist movement from its populist beginnings to Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, it had
arrived at a place where it could utilize the instruments of state power for its interests.

In order to accomplish this, they had to undermine important elements of what they perceived to be the policy foundation of the ascendent minorities and elevate the interests of the conservation movement. This would become the hidden pretext for the influential Heritage Foundation Report, “Agenda for Progress,” issued at the beginning of Reagan’s first term, which argued:

The federal budget, the keystone of national economic policy, is a bastion of immutability in a time of flux and inquiry. No longer a reflection of national goals, the inexorable forces of federal spending have become an obstacle to necessary and desired policy changes. The size and ambition of the federal establishment have become, in many ways, an impediment to the successful fulfillment of the basic obligation of a national government.59

The Report went on to recommend in the areas of employment, for example, that: temporary public jobs should be eliminated in lieu of a tax cut; comprehensive employment and training programs (CETA) should be “scaled down” and targeted; the minimum wage for youth should be eliminated; that federal provision of training and work experience to the unemployed should be “scaled down”; and the employment and training aspects of the Work Incentive Program should be eliminated.60

In general, the philosophy of social service involvement by the federal government which was projected in the Report harkened back at least to the early 1960s, when the states and private philanthropy provided as much as 60% of the funding for social welfare programs. No credence appeared to be given to the point of view that one reason for the “explosion” in federal funding after the 1967 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) amendments was that the states and private philanthropy were not, could not, and would not meet the degree of need for such services, a fact clearly communicated by the exploding cities at the hands of Black protesters.

The Reagan Administration proceeded to follow the advice of the emergent conservative policy establishment in a number of the areas suggested above. Reagan, therefore, rightly felt that he had a mandate from whites to pursue a policy of rearticulating race through the coded strategy of the budget, the Justice Department and other civil rights agencies, and by the attempted isolation of Black leadership. By such actions, Reagan went a long way toward legitimizing what Omi and Winant have considered to be the ultimate objective of authoritarian populism.

Measures under Reagan to roll back legislated checks on white hegemony have prejudiced some of the most fundamental civil rights initiatives. These include the reinstatement of tax exemptions to segregated educational institutions, as in the case of the Bob Jones Academy in 1981-82. The promotion of a strategy known as “New Federalism” seeks to remove from national responsibility some forty-five social programs to the jurisdiction of states. This is in light of the demonstrable fact that, when the balance of power between the states and the federal government has shifted in favor of the former, Blacks have historically suffered.61 In addition, Reagan’s procrastinating on the renewal of the Voting Rights Act also sought to
absolve certain southern states of special compliance with the Act, an area of the
country noted as a traditional stronghold of conservative, white hegemony. Other
noteworthy efforts include the debilitation of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission,
contributing to the restoration in the Justice Department of a pro-white, male agenda
with attempts, by 1985, to reverse some fifty affirmative action decisions taken by lower
courts. Indeed the Administration’s affirmative action programs were so flawed that
Reagan’s chief implementor of this strategy, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
Bradford Reynolds, was rejected for promotion by the Senate in 1985.

The much discussed question of whether or not, in this modern era and
considering the past upheavals attendant to the issue of racism and racial equality,
there could arrive in the White House a president who is racist, is historically
curious and painful. The question of the President’s personal racism is straightfor-
ward, if one views the conservative political movement as a manifestation of
Reagan’s personal leadership. However, it is a more difficult question—but I would
argue far more important—that the Reagan phenomenon should be more correctly
understood as a direct by-product of the conservative movement of white populist
nationalism. In this sense, it matters less that the President is personally racist than
that he conceives of his political mandate as having racial implications and
proceeds to carry them into his policy program through institutions which affect the
quality of life for millions of Americans. It may be possible to change the course of
policy if the problem is merely personal, but it is extremely difficult to do so where
there is a movement which undergirds a political consensus binding individuals of
various racial, religious and political persuasions to a common point of view in a
given historical moment.

Conclusion

It is, of course, no secret that older nationalist movements have undergone
transformations whereby nationalism turns into fascism in the desperate pursuit of
rearticulating those aspects of society perceived to stand in the way of the
reassumption of power by one disparate group or another. There should be little
illusion that, within the current white nationalist movement, there are, indeed,
possibilities for the achievement of what Bertram Gross has called “Friendly
Fascism”—a nameless, faceless brand of racial (and class) subjugation that would be
administered through the major institutions of society. Once the framework has
been set, as it appears to be, the 1984 elections having reflected the existence of
a racially polarized, political consensus as expressed in one of the largest electoral
landslides in history, all that is left is for the natural consequence of institutional
racism to work its will in the many fields of society.

This is indeed a formidable problem. Even in the 1960s when there was the
greatest admission that America was a racist society, there was an equal optimism
that racism could be eliminated through a process that the nation was willing to
undergo. This version of institutional racism might be regarded as a benign form,
where (it was possible to make the case) racism is insinuated into institutional
processes. Then there is the genuine search to root it out which takes into
consideration the reprocessing of individual and group behavior and, thus, institutional structures and functions. However, now there is at least the pretense of unconsciousness about racism’s presence and effects.

The Kerner Commission Report of 1968, which was written in the throes of a Black violent revolt, set out a vision of American society which could be achieved through the amelioration of the social ills of Blacks. By overthrowing this vision—and the possibilities of its achievement—what vision of the social order is being put in its place, and (more importantly) if it is not viewed by a major segment of the population as just, how will social harmony be maintained? The answers to these questions and others should take us considerably beyond the racial competition of the moment to consider where the current course is heading. This is a task which not only raises the question of responsibility, but calls for leadership of the first order to head off another clear and present danger of social conflict.

The stakes for the elimination of white racism are as urgent as they have ever been, yet society appears to be going in the other direction. When Knowles and Pruitt wrote about “Institutional Racism,” they were writing at the time when “there is much less articulation of a diehard defense of racism as a system by business and political leadership...” In the late 1960s they were able to observe that:

the mechanisms for subjugating black people have become interlaced with the complex of mechanisms by which power is exercised over both white and black. A root and branch abolition of racism, therefore, threatens the power order as we now know it. This is the fundamental political dynamic behind the institutional maintenance of racism.

However, what is there to be said for an era when institutions are busily implementing racist policies knowingly and with rationalizations? What is to be done when students at one of the finest universities throw watermelon at the walls of Black dormitory rooms; when young whites burn pictures of Martin Luther King, Jr. the night before his national holiday celebration, presumably following the example set by the Governor of Arizona who rescinded the holiday altogether; when white teachers from Queens “bristle” at an ameliorative strategy, such as a required course in racism? What is being destroyed now is not only the lives of some Blacks, but the hope that progressive change in the society is possible. It has formerly been this hope which has prevented the descent into an unavoidable spiral of despair which leads in the direction of chaos rather than community.

2. “Racism on the Rise.” Time Vol. 129, No. 5 (2 February 1982) p. 18-21. A Time Poll indicates, in the critical areas of housing, education and employment, the only area in which whites do not feel overwhelmingly that Blacks have the same opportunity in housing, and here the respondents are about equally divided. These differences may constitute the structural factors in the attitudes which help to maintain white nationalist ideology.
6. David Dantzig. “Conservatism after Goldwater.” Commen-
the front pages of national newspapers and on prime-time television was its sponsorship of a rash of cross-burnings in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, DC. Apparently some of these incidents were connected to the activities of William Mark Atkinsen, a student at the University of Maryland who preached that the only way the country would revive its laws and the laws of God was through armed violence.

34. Community Relations Service. Annual Report (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1986). It should be noted that the summary data represents all types of racial conflict involving several different varieties and groups. However, within these broad categories into which the data is divided, most of the cases are usually concerned with "General Community Relations" problems, followed by "Administration of Justice" and "Education" (desegregation) cases. The racial distribution is also relatively consistent through these years, which shows that, in all areas, Blacks were involved in 50.6 percent of the cases, Hispanics, 34.4 percent; Native Americans, 1.1 percent; and Asians, 2.3 percent. (Annual Report 1980) pp. 3-4.
44. "To Shoot Or Not to Shoot." Time (18 August 1980) p. 44.
47. Some evidence of this is found in the data of complaints gathered by the EEOC on "race and color" discrimination in the period from 1976 to 1982. See table 5.


52. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, op. cit., p. 86.

53. Ibid., pp. 116-117.


55. Ibid.


60. Ibid.


62. The Monitor (December 1986) op. cit.


65. Ibid., 171.
5 Dossier: Le Racisme au Québec, le mouvement Québécois pour combattre le racisme. $1.50
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