


**THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION  
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF  
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION  
(EAFORD)**

**Paper No.10**



**THE STRUCTURE OF THE ZIONIST  
MOVEMENT  
IN  
THE UNITED STATES  
by  
Rabbi Dr Elmer Berger**

**All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.**

**Universal Declaration of Human Rights**

# THE STRUCTURE OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES by Rabbi Dr Elmer Berger\*

## I

### Historical Introduction

It is difficult to blue-print the organizational structure of the Zionist movement in the United States – or anywhere else.<sup>1</sup> The difficulty derives from the fact that the movement — despite its protestations claiming to be a voluntary, indigenous free association in any country where it operates — is a supra-national foreign entity, (“public body”). It was so “recognized” in Article 4 of the Mandate. The same article put down the condition that “the Zionist organization” could play this role “subject always to the control of the Administration” and “so long as its organization and constitution are *in the opinion of the Mandatory* appropriate . . .”. (emphasis supplied).

Except for a brief period in the middle 1920’s however, the British Government appears to have paid little attention to the appropriateness of either the organization or its constitution. Nor was the Mandatory government consistent about the “control” exercised over the Zionist organization. Students of the history have even argued that “control” was often exercised the other way around.<sup>2</sup>

Motivated more by political than legal or moral considerations, later British governments began to doubt the wisdom of this pro-Zionist commitment. In the mid 1920’s the British half-heartedly questioned the authenticity of the Zionist organization’s capacity to enlist “all Jews . . . willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home”, which is also language from Article 4 of the Mandate. These inquiries, together with clear indications the British were favoring improved relations with “the Arabs”, stimulated Weizmann and his colleagues to create a structure which at least *appeared* to be more representative of “the Jewish people” than the formal Zionist organization.

## II

### Building the Machinery

The ultimate authority for the Zionist movement was the World Zionist Congress. Then — as now — it was a fairly democratic body. It was composed of delegates elected by its own procedures from *all* Zionist parties

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from all countries in which recognized Zionist movements had been established. *The Congress is still the supreme authority of the Zionist movement.* It regulates the activities of a number of "Departments", most of which were organized to fulfill social, economic and educational functions in the process of building "the national home". There is, for example, a Department of Education, a Department of Agriculture, a Department of Settlement and Immigration. The Congress' Executive determines the budget and allocates funds. Theoretically, the funds are derived from what amounts to a tax, called the "shekel". Payment of the *shekel* is mandatory for voting representation in the Congress. In reality the shekel produced only nominal sums and the homeland-building activities of the Zionist movement are financed by substantial sums collected throughout the "Diaspora" by fiscal agencies of which The Palestine Foundation Fund and The Jewish National Fund are the largest.<sup>3</sup>

In the mid-1920's, when British doubts began to rise, Chaim Weizmann was the President of the Congress and Zionism's principle liason with the Mandatory government. It therefore became essentially Weizmann's responsibility to persuade the Congress that it was necessary to provide a satisfactory answer to the Mandatory's inquiry about the capability of the movement to represent "the Jewish people". In addition to this political consideration, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Zionist movement, on its own, was incapable of financing the building of the National Home. At least funds of that dimension could not be raised with sufficient rapidity to offer conclusive proof to the vacillating British that "the Jewish people" was prepared to mobilize sufficient resources to exploit to full advantage the "promise" of the Balfour Declaration.

Weizmann's access to British authority provided him with insights into that authority which enabled him to anticipate a British reversal of policy, given any plausible pretext.<sup>4</sup>

The dilemma for the Congress – or at least for its ideological purists – was that to satisfy the Mandatory's implied doubts it would be necessary to recruit Jews who were not "shekel" paying (not Zionists) into the work of building the National Home. Weizmann was always capable of temporarily sublimating his ideology to pragmatics. He finally won a bitter fight in the Congress to "negotiate" with Jews, many of whom as individuals were not only not Zionists, but who were publicly declared active opponents of the whole concept of "Jewish" nationalism and therefore opposed to the idea of a Jewish "*national home*".

### III

#### "Synthetic" Zionism and the Jewish Agency

Reluctantly the Congress gave its consent. Weizmann proceeded to lay plans for enlisting the support and participation of the leadership of essentially anti-Zionist American Jews. To bridge the gap Weizmann coined the term "non-Zionist". The nomenclature was intended to identify

a Jew who was willing to contribute material aid to the building of the "national home" but was recognized as opposing the concept of "Jewish" nationalism. Weizmann's own, cynical definition of the term is apt. In his autobiography, *Trial and Error*, he described the synthetic creation as

Those wealthy Jews who could not wholly divorce themselves from a feeling of responsibility toward their people, but at the same time could not identify themselves with the hopes of the masses, were prepared with a sort of left-handed generosity, on condition that their right hand did not know what their left hand was doing . . . They would give – with disclaimers; we would accept – with reservations.<sup>5</sup>

The principle focus of Weizmann's "diplomacy" were the leaders of the American Jewish Committee, in the mid-1920's the most prestigious collection of American Jews, generous philanthropists, but anti-Zionist almost to a man. How this mesalliance was finally consummated is a story of naivete on the part of American Jews. They believed Weizmann's tactically watered-down version of Zionist aspirations and relied upon the Mandatory to enforce the "safeguard" clauses of the Balfour Declaration, protecting *both* Palestinian Arabs and anti-Zionist Jews from any possible threats to their existing nationality status by any unrestricted Zionist aggressiveness. These "non-Zionist" Americans were also victimized by a sense of guilt at their own security in the United States, on the one hand, and the still precarious conditions under which Jews in eastern and middle Europe continued to live, on the other hand.

The wily Weizmann was equal to the challenge. Mixing deceit with trading upon the innocence (and idealistic impulses) of his American "negotiating-partners", the Enlarged Jewish Agency was established in 1929.

#### IV

#### The Enlarged Jewish Agency

In broad terms the Agency became the institution "cooperating" with the Mandatory in the national home project. In return for their prestige – and financial support – the "non-Zionists" were allocated 50% of the membership of the Enlarged Agency.<sup>6</sup> But the Zionist organization was given the right to appoint members to the Agency from those countries where the American "non-Zionists" had no constituency and no means for creating one.<sup>7</sup>

From the beginning the structure was Jerry-built. The 50% membership constitutionally allocated to the World Zionist Organization was a disciplined caucus. Its policy positions were determined by the Congress. The "non-Zionists", on the other hand, had no real constituency. The American Jews had consistently resisted over-all umbrella structures which, in some prescribed, democratic procedure might have elected representatives to the Agency. Constantly frustrated by this lack of a

constituency, by the disciplined voting of the 50% Zionist membership, augmented by the Zionist organization's selection to fill the "non-Zionist" seats from those countries where there was not even as definite a constituency (or recognized leadership) as among American Jews, the American "non-Zionists" early-on lost influence and then interest in the Agency. By the middle 1930's meaningful "non-Zionist" representation was non-existent. The Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization were, for all practical purposes, identical.<sup>8</sup>

## V

### The United Jewish Appeal

The default (or freezing out) of the "non-Zionists" created no problems of conscience for the Zionist organization. On the contrary, it simplified the Agency's increasingly apparent and deliberate divergence from and defiance of the Mandate and the Mandatory's policies. It facilitated the Agency's organization of illegal immigration, for example; and when, in the closing years of World War II, the Agency concentrated its principal efforts on mobilizing the support of the United States Government for its territorial/statehood claims, it could do so without any visible and therefore politically effective opposition from "non-Zionists" within its own ranks. This necessitated the creation of independent anti-Zionist efforts, of which the American Council for Judaism was then the foremost, organized group.

Two factors facilitated the transition of the Zionist movement in the United States from the artificial "partnership" with the "non-Zionists" to an independent, solo role uninhibited by even mild, internal, "non-Zionist" restraints.

The first were the genocidal policies of Hitler, coupled with the slow perception by the rest of the world of the dimensions of the tragedy. Whatever were the true dimensions, there was no efficacious, international program for coping with it. Consequently, the portrayal of the problem and the activation of a program offering a *perceived* relief commensurate with Zionist definitions of the problem became the almost exclusive prerogative of the Zionist movement. The offered solution was recognition of the historical Zionist aspiration to Palestine to create a Zionist state in which all Jews – "the Jewish people" – would possess the nationality right of immigration and to which all Jews were, correspondingly, "obligated" to provide resources to support conventional institutions of statehood. The expertise of Zionist propagandists made the most of this confluence of developments. Opposition to Zionism was no longer diluted or diminished by simple ignorance of Zionism's character and objectives, as Weizmann had attractively packaged these to snare "non-Zionists" into the Enlarged Jewish agency. Near-hysterical support for the "realism" of the Zionist solution to "the Jewish problem" practically foreclosed public, analytical debate or dialogue about Zionism. Palestinian and/or Arab interests and rights in a democratic, self-determination formula were simply blotted out

in the clamor for “refuge”. At best “the Arabs” became non-people. At worst they were inhumane, ignorant, backward, unworthy of consideration when compared to the “need” of “the Jewish people”. Enormous and well-orchestrated political, economic, social and emotional pressures swept virtually *all* Americans – including others than Jews – into almost uncritical trust in and support of the Zionist movement and its objectives. The absence of competent Arab information, responsibly demonstrating the inevitable deprivation of national rights for non-“Jewish people” Palestinians, if the Zionist aspirations were realized, also contributed to the virtually unchallenged Zionist political achievements.

The second development which facilitated the efforts of the Zionist movement to capitalize on withering “non-Zionist” participation in the Jewish Agency was the merger in 1938 of the two, principle “charitable” funds sustained by American Jews to provide relief for the shattered lives of European Jews.<sup>9</sup> The Zionists initiated the merger.<sup>10</sup> The American Joint Distribution Committee for decades had been the major overseas relief instrument. The JDC had been founded and controlled by anti-Zionists. It was committed – on principle – to constructive projects for rebuilding and sustaining Jewish institutions *in the countries in which the needy Jews lived*. Consistent with the ideology of the leaders of American Jews the JDC also worked in sophisticated ways to establish or to firm up the application of equal citizenship rights and responsibilities for these Jews in their native or citizenship countries.

The major Zionist fund was the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod). It was a “general revenue” source for the Jewish Agency. Its contributions were augmented by contributions from the Jewish National Fund which concentrated on the acquisition and development of land in Palestine for “the Jewish people”.

The plausible rationale which the Zionists offered for merging the Palestine Foundation Fund and the JDC was “efficiency”, “reduction of duplicating fund-raising mechanisms”, “diminution of overhead”. *Informed* anti-Zionists opposed the merger. But the appeal to such efficiency, with greater amounts of money available to the needy recipients, together with the cultivated predilections to support the camouflaged Zionist program as the only available, “permanent” solution for Europe’s Jewish victims of Hitler, made the merger proposition irresistible. And so the United Jewish Appeal was born. The JDC was technically a full partner. But, as in the Jewish Agency, the more disciplined zealotry of the Zionist fund-raising machinery slowly eroded the influence of the JDC anti-Zionists, now diluted by Weizmann semantics to “non-Zionists”. Allocations to the JDC were gradually reduced. Those to the PFF increased. For the Zionists, it was a self-fulfilling arrangement. The less resources available to the JDC the less it could provide for restoration of acceptable conditions for Jews who might elect repatriation to their

European homes. This, in turn, enhanced Zionism's appeal to the survivors to elect Palestine as their haven for refuge. The more this "choice" became evident the greater were the Zionist claims upon the merged funds.

## VI

### "Great Power" Declarations

This situation obtained in 1947 and 1948, at the time of the great debate about Palestine's political future. The establishment of the Zionist state forced the JDC into almost total eclipse. The "national home" now existed. Its accessibility – plus the coercive methods used by the Zionist apparatus in the D.P. camps, (many of the same are now employed on emigres from the Soviet Union) plus Zionist-stimulated fears among Jews in Arab countries (Iraq is a good example)<sup>11</sup> – produced a flood of immigration and created attendant economic and social problems. With their critical capacities still numbed by the European tragedy the "non-Zionists" gave unstintingly – and without any real control – to the now Zionist-dominated United Jewish Appeal. The JDC was forced, for the first time, to undertake some ("non-political"?) programs in the Zionist state.

It is crucially important that for all these years the Zionist organization was a recognized "public body". Nevertheless, all countries in which it operated local branches privileged it to function as if it had been a domestic, voluntary, free association of local citizens. United Jewish Appeal funds were employed to help build what British – and later a joint British/American – investigating commissions<sup>12</sup> identified as a "state within a state". It helped finance the Zionist organization's political activities (including the organization, transportation, food, clothing and housing for "immigrants"). But contributions to the UJA were accorded privileges usually limited to genuinely philanthropic institutions. In Britain, while the Mandate was operative, this was perhaps understandable. The Mandate authorized "cooperation" between the Mandatory government and the Jewish Agency. In the United States, anti-Zionists regularly protested this "mingling" of "philanthropic" and national/political funds.<sup>13</sup> They claimed a kind of taxation without representation. Many of them refused to contribute to the UJA under these circumstances. But a majority of American Jews felt a demanding, moral obligation to help in the reconstruction of the lives of their fellow Jews who had survived Hitler. Traditional anti-Zionists objected to being coerced into support of the "Jewish state"-building process by the contractual relationship between the JDC and the PFF, together with the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency's role as recipient of the contracted percentage designated for "relief and reconstruction" in Palestine. Lower bureaucratic levels of the United States Government sometimes offered encouraging response to these anti-Zionist objections. But no corrective action was ever taken at the policy-making level. There was little doubt the reason was political.<sup>14</sup>

The Government's refusal to enforce its own tax regulations complicated



the task of precisely identifying Zionists or Zionist organizations. In a loose sense any Jew (or Christian) contributing to the United Jewish Appeal became a supporter of the Zionist movement, willy-nilly. Local fund-raising *organizations* for the UJA were in the same position. Contractual agreements between such local fund-raising organizations (in the character of community funds, helping to support local hospitals, community centers and the like) and the UJA and the Jewish Agency/Zionist organization, made it virtually impossible for an American Jew to assist financially any local Jewish institutions without, *involuntarily*, contributing to the advancement of Zionist objectives.

The Government was not unaware of these dilemmas. At times after the establishment of the Zionist state, when conflicts between the state and the United States developed, the Executive branch of the Government sometimes threatened either to embargo UJA funds or to deprive them of the privilege of tax-deductibility for Federal Income Tax purposes.<sup>15</sup> The action was never taken, but the "leaks" indicated the Government knew UJA funds were not employed in full compliance with the Internal Revenue regulations.<sup>16</sup>

On several occasions anti-Zionists – informally – suggested to representatives of Arab governments posted in the United States that formal protests, in low-level diplomatic instruments, should be made to the United States Government. The substance of the suggested protest would be that in allowing the privilege of tax-deductibility the United States Government was acquiescing in actions hostile to states with which the United States maintained – and wanted to maintain – friendly relations. Nothing came of these suggestions, either.

## VII

### The State and its Extra-Territorial Zionist Apparatus

The establishment of the Zionist state created ideological and structural dilemmas for the Zionist movement. The situation was reminiscent of the condition Weizmann confronted just before he initiated the negotiations to create the Enlarged Jewish Agency.

Two, related problems were involved. First, the *Declaration of Establishment* of the state identifies "the Jewish people" and the Zionist movement as parties to the establishment. It also declared that the state was "open" to "Jewish immigration" and "Ingathering the Exiles". In plain language this means the *recruitment* of Jews to populate the state. The state's earliest legislation included "The Law of (the) Return", granting any Jew, anywhere – as a constituent of "the Jewish people" – the *right* to immigrate. The "Law of (the) Return" was followed by the Nationality Law which automatically invested every *Jew* who immigrated with Israeli citizenship unless the "oleh" (immigrant) renounced the citizenship. (Some Israeli legal authorities contend that Israeli citizenship is automatically acquired merely by application for an immigration visa, whether, or not, immigration takes place).

## VIII

### “The Jewish People”

“The Jewish people”, in other words, was a beneficiary of what Dr W. T. Mallison in his legal analyses of the situation, has described as a “functional second nationality”, in addition to the legal, conventional nationality of Jews in the countries of their citizenship.<sup>17</sup> To put it still another way – and in somewhat less legalistic terms – “the Jewish people” was considered part of the body-politic of the Zionist state. It was the recipient of “rights” and, *via* the ongoing operations of the Zionist organization was expected to fulfill certain Israeli national obligations. These included financial support for an actual “*aliyah*” (immigration) providing Jewish population for the Zionist state, which, although it posed as a democracy, was committed to maintaining its Zionist character.<sup>18</sup> This commitment could be sustained only if the state first created and then maintained a permanent majority of Zionists.

But the conventionally recognized government of the state wanted to assert its independent sovereignty and the independent sovereignty of the state, itself, as distinguished from the Zionist movement. Now that Zionism was sovereignized in a state, in other words, the ambivalence of the movement became a problem in practical politics to add to the ideological conundrum it had been in the days of the Mandate.

The second condition contributing to the Zionist/Israel dilemma was that when the state declared its establishment and terminated the Mandate, it liquidated also the basis for international legal recognition of the Zionist movement which Article 4 of the Mandate had provided.

These ambiguous conditions troubled the management of the Zionist movement. In the context of Zionist ideology (and even Israeli/Zionist legislation) Zionists felt that if they were expected to continue carrying obligations for the state they were entitled to some input in the determination of the state’s policies. The Zionist movement also was reluctant to lose its “recognized” international, legal status as “the representative” of “the Jewish people’s” claim to identity as a “nationality”. The so-called “non-Zionists” were now confronted with an agonizing dilemma of their own making. They, too, were juridically beneficiaries of the Zionist state’s “supra-national”, Zionist nationality claims for “the Jewish people”. And these “non-Zionists” continued to protest their rejection of “Jewish people” nationality rights and obligations.

## IX

### The “Status” Law

This accumulation of dilemmas came to a climax in 1951 before and during the 23rd World Zionist Congress. Officials of the Israeli government were in attendance in their several capacities as members of political parties in Israel with “branches” in the various Zionist organizations operating in the countries from which “shekel”-determined

delegates had been elected (or selected). After protracted negotiations, which had preceded the Congress and continued to dominate the Congress' debates, arrangements were made for a cooperative effort between the Zionist organization and the Israeli government to draft legislation to replace the Mandate's Article 4 and regularize and legitimate the relationships between the movement and the government of the state.<sup>19</sup>

This effort produced the "World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency for Israel (Status) Law", enacted by the Knesset in 1952. The legislation assigned certain Zionist national responsibilities to the Zionist organization, leaving others to the conventionally recognized government of the state. The law specified that the state

Recognizes the World Zionist Organization as the *authorized agency* which will *continue* to operate in the State of Israel for the development and settlement of the country, the absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora and the coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations active in those fields. (Emphasis supplied) (Paragraph 4)<sup>20</sup>

At another place the "Status" law acknowledges that "The World Zionist Organization . . . is also the Jewish Agency . . ." (Paragraph 3)

Paragraph 5 of the "Status" Law states,

The mission of gathering in the exiles, *which is the central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist movement* in our days, requires constant efforts of the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of *all Jews*, as individuals and groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration to it of the masses of the people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose. (Emphasis supplied)

Paragraph 6 designates the World Zionist Organization as its agency "for achieving this unity . . .".

In 1954 the Israeli government and the Executive of the Jewish Agency signed a "Covenant". The Covenant, first of all, transformed the domestically enacted Knesset "Status" Law into an international instrument. It also specified the areas in which the Zionist movement, in "coordination" with the government of the state, would make the "Status" Law operative. (Paragraph 1 of the Covenant)<sup>21</sup>

The general functions assigned the WZO/JA cover a full agenda of activities all of which are national in character; and furthermore, "development", "settlement" and "absorption of immigrants" are all Israeli/Zionist activities which have a relevance to the political situation involving the Zionist state and "Arabs", both within the state, or in the so-called territories".

These functions assigned to the World Zionist Organization/Jewish

Agency impact upon the state's relationship to contiguous Arab states. Immigration, settlement, development are broad enough definitions to include just about any activity financed by "philanthropic" funds collected through the United Jewish Appeal. The functional situation, in other words, has changed little, if any, from that performed by the Jewish Agency under the Mandate. Only now the "cooperation" is with the Israeli government rather than with the Mandatory power.

It is a striking truth, but little recognized by governments of states other than Israel that at the 23rd Congress a resolution of *the Zionist Organization itself*, acknowledged the state

Shall act in consultation and coordination with the World Zionist Organization . . . in all activities conducted *in the interests of the State of Israel* within the Diaspora. (Emphasis supplied)<sup>22</sup>

The same Zionist Organization-initiated resolution calls for

Prior consultation between the Government and Executive of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency . . . on all matters regarding legislation by the State of Israel touching upon the activities of the World Zionist Organization.

And finally the same resolution declares the state may

From time to time empower the Executive of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency to work within the spheres defined . . . by special agreement with the Israel Government.

The "Status law" provides (Paragraph 9) for a "Coordination Board", composed of an equal number of members representing the government and the WZO/JA. The minutes of the "Coordination Board" are classified information. But the Coordination Board has the authority to divide the Israeli national functions between the WZO/JA and the government and to allocate Zionist funds accordingly. In fact, the WZO/JA and the government each has departments with identical names. There is, for example, a Ministry of Immigration in the government and a Department with the same name in the WZO/JA. The WZO/JA has a Department of Agriculture as does the government.

Legal authorities who have examined the legislation and the actual functioning of both the government and the WZO/JA are uncertain whether to say the "Status" law created two, separate sovereignties contractually linked by law, or one sovereignty composed of an operational arm delivering services to the part of "the Jewish people" national entity living in Israel with another arm performing parallel services for the part of "the Jewish people" living in the Diaspora.

*Whichever description is more precise it is clear that of its own volition the WZO is either an agency of the Israeli government or an integral part of the*

government. It certainly is *not* a free, voluntary, association. Furthermore, given the fiscal controls exercised by the JA, as the ultimate recipient of the largest share of overseas “philanthropy” contributed by American Jews, the national integrity of the UJA – and of the tributaries which direct either funds or services to this ultimate recipient – is open to question.

## X

### Lack of General Knowledge

It is crucial that only an infinitesimal fraction of American Jews is aware of these intricate legalisms. A growing number are increasingly resentful of the percentages of their “philanthropic” contribution which end up in one or another Israeli/Zionist state project. But very few of even these are informed of the complex of contractual relations which account for this distribution. They are also unaware that within Israel itself these Jewish Agency controlled funds are available *only* for projects and services which benefit “Jewish people” nationals of the state. Non-“Jewish people” nationals may share equally – or proportionately – from *Israeli state* funds collected through taxation or perhaps obtained from the United States in the form of “foreign assistance”. But non-“Jewish people” nationals are excluded by Zionist organization legislation and administration from benefits accruing from the finances and services provided the state by this Zionist infra-structure, shadow government. To a substantial extent this duality in function and availability of resources accounts for the disparity within Israel between the “Arab” population and the Jewish population in such fields as housing, education, public utilities and services. “Jewish” agriculture, “Jewish” education, “Jewish” development are subsidized, over and above state allocations, by these “Zionist” funds. This structure accounts, to a large extent, for the racism practised within Israel and is consistent with the ideological commitment of the Zionist organization to serve “the Jewish people”. But it is also true that the resultant discriminations are practised with the full consent – even partnership – of the government of the state.<sup>23</sup>

## XI

### The Operating Covenant

The 1954 “Covenant” transformed the unilaterally enacted Knesset “Status” law into an operating international arrangement.

The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency remained a “public body”. Pursuant to Section 2 of the “Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended”, the World Zionist Organization was required to register as a “foreign agent” with the United States Department of Justice. Through the efforts of anti-Zionists, with Dr W.T. Mallison, Jr, acting as legal advisor, the Department of Justice required, as part of the recorded information, inclusion of relevant sections of the 1954 “covenant”.<sup>24</sup>

The “Status” Law/Covenant codified the State of Israel’s “Jewish people” claims. Together with the 1954 Covenant it authorized the Zionist

state to make operational its asserted jurisdiction of "rights" and "duties" reaching to all Jews – no matter what their citizenship. It elevated Zionism from a mere theory to a legislated program alleging the Zionist state's claimed prerogative to conduct itself as if it were in fact – and were recognized in fact – as "the sovereign state of the Jewish people" as it was described by the Israel's highest courts in the so-called "Eichmann Case".<sup>25</sup> There can be little doubt that the assertion of such jurisdiction and the deliberate employment of such language *in law* (not mere propaganda) violated – at the least – the conventional amenities of the relationships of sovereign states and the integrity of the nationality status of the *Jewish* citizens of these states other than Israel.

But as had happened consistently in the historical development of the Zionist movement and despite formal protests of American anti-Zionist Jews, no effective, United States governmental action was taken against the proliferating acceptance of Zionist "duties" by an increasing number of American Jewish organizations. In 1964, the then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs did respond to lengthy and protracted protestations of the American Council for Judaism by declaring "the Jewish people" concept was not recognized by the United States as "a valid concept of international law."<sup>26</sup> But the declaration remained academic. Despite further urgings to apply the rejection to the Zionist apparatus in the United States, no practical, governmental action was undertaken.

## XII

### The United States Senate Investigates

Such consistent – and probably deliberate – dereliction encouraged the Zionist apparatus to attempt to expand its controls over all organized activities of Jews in the United States. Efforts were made to co-opt entire organizations into the Zionist movement. But the tradition of anti-Zionism and the historic antipathy of American Jews to any over-all "Jewish community" structure frustrated these efforts. Nothing daunted by the failure at grass-roots recruiting, Zionist strategy resorted to an extension of its strategy of creating "front" organizations. In addition it infiltrated the chartered American organizations at sensitive levels. The rationale for this infiltration process was that now, with the State of Israel a recognized fact, it should be considered an integral part of the program of every organization of Jews (no matter its originally chartered purpose) to stimulate understanding and improve relationships between American Jews and the "Jewish" state. To facilitate realization of this "soft-sell" objective, American organizations were persuaded to employ Israeli citizens to teach Hebrew, to supervise programs featuring Israeli society, economy and, not the least, instructions in Middle East affairs, naturally from the Zionist/Israeli viewpoint.<sup>27</sup> The principal "front" created by the Zionist apparatus was given the omnibus title of "Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations", popularly known as "The

President's Conference". It is an absolutely safe assumption that not one percent of the membership of a number of religious, fraternal and social-service institutions knew their organizations were represented in this Conference, much less possessed any sophisticated knowledge of its activities.

There is also an *admitted* Zionist lobby, headquartered in Washington. It is called "The American-Israel Political Action Committee", more popularly identified by the acronym AIPAC. AIPAC at least had the decency to admit it was not entitled to share in tax-deductible "philanthropic" dollars. Ostensibly, it financed its budget by special appeals for designated funds from card-carrying Zionists. It did not admit to subsidies from the Jewish Agency-American section because such financing would have altered its perceived status from an acknowledged lobby of Americans to that of a foreign agent.

It is obvious, from this functional/historical/structural analysis so far, that the Zionist apparatus was in effective control of practically all organized activity of Jews in the United States. But it would be inaccurate to attribute this situation to any formal, voluntary, deliberated and informed decision made by the majority of American Jews. Deception, manipulation through control of power-centers and control of funds were the decisive factors. Most American Jews – still innocent of the true character of Zionist ideology and of the racist/expansionist character of the Zionist state ("the Arabs" were successfully propagandized as villains) – were satisfied to be supportive of Israel, largely on humanitarian grounds. Virtually none, now involuntarily co-opted to "Jewish people" nationality, were aware of the Zionist state's claims to jurisdiction or of its designs against Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular.

In 1963, J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate became suspicious of the "spontaneity" with which so many American Jewish organizations took *official* action or made *official* pronouncements in concert with particular Israeli interests and declared policies. At his instigation the Senate appropriated funds for a sub-committee to investigate the efficacy of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and its enforcement. Senator Fulbright had a whole roster of "unregistered foreign agents" he wished to investigate, operating in the interests of a number of foreign countries or "foreign principals". But, to a large extent, these were window-dressing. The record (published in 1963)<sup>28</sup> of the questioning and evidence produced by the investigation suggests unmistakably that Zionist activities were the prime target. The published transcript (mysteriously printed by the Government Printing office in such short supply it soon became unobtainable) contains about 400 pages devoted to the Zionist apparatus – by far the lengthiest of the records produced by the Hearings.

The committee had the power to subpoena files of the organizations

questioned. And the record therefore, is probably the most complete and detailed exposure of the extent and intricacies of the Zionist network ever assembled. It is, in fact, probably a fair assumption that the record "knows" more about the extent of Zionist levers and lever-operators than even most officials of the Zionist organization, let alone either the average Zionist or even less, the average Jew.

A whole system of "conduits" existed to "launder" funds, or to appear to launder them. The perception made it possible for private foundations, Middle East study centers, Synagogue Councils and other institutions, presumably removed from Zionist disciplines, to accept measurable contributions with either genuine or easily feigned innocence. The "Administrative expenses" of the "President's Conference", for example, were financed from "philanthropic" funds which had gone to the Jewish Agency and "returned" to the United States to subsidize political activities in support of Israeli interests.

Although the Foreign Agents Registration Act required coordination between the Department of Justice and the Department of State, neither Executive Department of the United States Government took any significant action. Congress did enact amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act however and these amendments – designed to close loopholes in the statute and to produce better enforcement – did not go unnoticed by the managers of the Zionist movement.

### III

#### Re-Organization of the Jewish Agency

In 1971, spear-headed by Jewish Agency officials in Israel and by "non-Zionist" "philanthropists" in the United States, the Jewish Agency was "re-organized". Mr Max Fisher, who was Mr Nixon's court Jew and President of the United Israel Appeal (The United Palestine Appeal, re-named to reflect the establishment of the State of Israel) was the leading participant from the United States. Mr Arye Pincus, who was Chairman of the old Jewish Agency Executive, was the leading Israeli.

It is beyond the scope of this analysis to detail the specifics of the "re-organization". It suffices to state that, in essence, the "re-organization" structurally, was nothing more than an effort to revive the *perception* of the Jewish Agency as a body representative of "the Jewish people" by co-opting again, as Weizmann had done in 1929, a roster of "non-Zionist" "philanthropists". Reflecting this objective the re-organized Agency is now called the "Reconstituted Jewish Agency". Special weighting was given to the dominant financial role which the American United Jewish Appeal played in assembling the Jewish Agency budget.<sup>29</sup> The "non-Zionists" on the new executive all come from the United Israel Appeal. Dr Israel Goldstein, an American now residing in Israel and Chairman of the Keren Hayesod, the Hebrew name of the international structure whose American branch is United Israel Appeal, summed up the "democratizing" of the New Agency:



Among those representing the so-called non-Zionist side of the expanded Agency . . . there are many people who are outright Zionists.<sup>30</sup> (Emphasis supplied)

The most important alteration effectuated by the “reconstitution” is that the new Agency is now held out to be purely “philanthropic”. That is, its claimed, actual functions are to supply the funds and supervise activities in the fields of “immigration, absorption, agricultural, settlement, education, health and welfare”.<sup>31</sup> To put it differently, the Reconstituted Jewish Agency will no longer engage in the kinds of political activities in which the Enlarged Agency was involved. If the plastic surgery can withstand close scrutiny of these now-claimed services, the “new” Agency could be relieved of the obligation to register as a “Foreign Agent”.

Political activities are now the responsibility of the World Zionist Organization. WZO is both a full partner in the Reconstituted Agency and also claims to be an “independent” institution committed to Israeli national interests including political action in countries in which the WZO has branches.

The WZO is assured that its budget, derived from Reconstituted Jewish Agency receipts,

Will remain more or less in the same proportion to the income of the Jewish Agency.<sup>32</sup>

In 1972, the WZO was budgeted at \$28 million from Jewish Agency funds. these are admittedly used for “activities in the diaspora of a political nature”.<sup>33</sup>

The former Coordination Board of the “Status” Law is now baptized the “Coordination Forum”.

The “Reconstitution” was simply a moving around of the same pieces on the same old chess board. The cosmetology however, has produced some new perceptions, favorable to the image of the Zionist movement. Ostensibly, through their “non-Zionist” delegates, all local Jewish fund-raising organizations are participants in the Reconstituted Jewish Agency. But even with this inflated image the Reconstituted Agency claims to represent only 2.5 million Jews and the number of admitted, registered Zionists in 1971 was only 900,000, world-wide.<sup>34</sup>

The historic pattern of Zionist arrogation of authority to represent Jews therefore, remains the same. Without derogating a natural – even if uninformed – sympathy for Israel (or at least its *supposedly* “deprived” and “threatened” people) the Zionist claim that “the majority of Jews” are committed genuinely and knowledgeably to Zionism and its racist/“Jewish people” nationality is a propagandistically inflated facade. Maintenance of the facade is facilitated by a highly sophisticated “information” operation, on the one hand, and uninformed or even worse, misinformed Jews, on the other hand. And the facade is converted to substantive distortions of

American policies by as craven and unimaginative a collection of political "leaders" and advisors as is to be found anywhere on planet earth.

As Weizmann observed in the 1920's when he was slickly neutralizing anti-Zionists with the semantics of "non-Zionism", it is still true the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing. It may also be true that having been misled to make commitments of money, effort and emotion, many of these Jews do not *want* the right hand to know what the left is doing. Such knowledge could create intense, personal discomfort contemplating the strenuous and unpleasant task of undoing what had been blindly done. And because "social" (and economic) status has so often been closely tied to financial support of Zionist endeavours such an "undoing", in some situations, can result in rather revolutionary alterations of life-styles.

#### XIV

#### Conclusions

This over-view of the development of the Zionist structure and its method of operations suggests several conclusions for those attempting to replace Zionism's exclusivist ideology and program with non-racial, non-discriminatory programs.

The conclusions may be relevant whether the desired objective of any activist is to democratize the life-patterns of Jews (or more precisely Jewish organizations) in the United States or, on the international scene, to eliminate Zionism's divisive impact on the Middle East and to democratize Palestine. The conclusions may be relevant also to any prepared to settle for the shorter-term goal of containing Zionism by putting an end to Zionist/Israeli expansionism.

#### A. Some "Don'ts"

1. It is probably an exercise in futility simply to compile an inventory of "Zionist organizations". At their inflated most they authentically represent a mere fraction of the Jews of the world and particularly of Jews in the United States.<sup>35</sup>

2. It is probably also a tactical mistake to challenge Zionism as a purely "Jewish" problem, largely restricted to the narrowest definitions of the Arab/Zionist conflict. The lack of efficacy of this approach is, in part at least, attributable to the *inadequacy* of Arab public relations over a long period of time. Given the effectiveness and sophistication of Zionist propaganda generally and the tardiness of "the Arabs" in mounting both the machinery and the information policies needed to counter this propaganda – in a head-to-head confrontation – the battle must remain uneven for a long time. Meanwhile, the Zionist state – with American indulgences – proceeds inexorably to consolidate its territorial gains in the Middle East and, by smooth propaganda, to anesthetize both Jews and others to its policies.

## B. Some "Do's"

1. Basic strategy for winning minds to non-racial, non-discriminatory, democratic alternatives to Zionism should be designed to separate the "garden-variety", uninformed or misinformed Jews (and other Americans) from slavish, uninformed following of Zionist "leadership". This approach requires genuine alternatives. Positive and affirmative programs are needed rather than head-to-head, purely negative confrontations. The information-strategy employed must be targeted at a broad, cross-section of the total American people rather than a frontal, one-dimensional appeal to, or attack on, Jews. The latter approach is often counter-productive because it nourishes suspicion that Jews are being singled out as victims for holding opinions or engaging in activities which do – in part – obtain among others than Jews.

2. Despite the recommendation for broad-gauge campaigns it is important that Jews be *visibly* a part of the effort. In the first place, *knowledgeable* Jews have a sensitivity to actions or semantics which, justifiably or not, Jews traditionally find offensive. (Many an information effort of merit has boomeranged because an unfortunate – and unnecessary – word or phrase or allusion was employed). Terms like "international Jewry" or "Judaists", allegations of "conspiracy" are examples of semantics which trigger suspicions about the motives of the one who employs them. Exaggerated analogies comparing Zionism's rather subtle racism to "Hitlerism" open the door to polemics which divert attention from the real issues.

There is no intricate Zionist "conspiracy". Zionism has employed one of the best propaganda machines the world has ever known. It generally signals its intentions loudly and clearly. It has succeeded in furthering undemocratic programs and policies because all too few *knew enough about Zionism* to read and properly interpret its gaudy propaganda.

Visible participation by responsible Jews in any campaign to defeat Zionism is probably important also because it adds credibility to the substance of the campaign and to the decent intentions of the campaigners, as well. AJAZ is a working, practical example. It enlists supporters from a cross-section of America despite – or perhaps because of – the fact it is known as American *Jewish* Alternatives to Zionism.

A third reason for an information campaign designed to appeal to the totality of Americans – *including Jews* but not setting them apart – is that identification with the American body politic is precisely what most American Jews want. Zionism calls this "assimilation", using the term pejoratively and suggesting that "assimilation" in the United States (or any democratic state) means the disappearance of Jews. Something of this is perceived in the Israeli propaganda line that equates the Palestinian goal of a secular, democratic, unitary state as the "destruction" of the state and Israeli propagandists usually add, of "the Jewish people", as well. But Zionist propaganda itself trades on the fundamental aspiration of Jews – at

least in the United States – to be recognized as full and accepted parts of the American people. This is why Zionist propaganda in the United States stresses that Israel is “the bulwark of democracy” in the Middle East, “the defender of American interests against communism”, “America’s only reliable ally in the Middle East”. Without these propaganda themes – using only narrow, chauvinistic appeals to Zionist loyalty and its segregationist ideology – support among American Jews would diminish because support among Americans generally would decline.

3. A corollary to these strategic/personnel suggestions concerns the substance of any contemplated information programs. As a general rule, substance should be put in the context of broad, *American* interests. Such interests can be in two broad categories. One is perceived national, *material* interests. Oil, of course, tops the list at the moment. Markets for American products are another. Strategic, geo/political interests also enlist interest among Americans. Without exploiting “cold war” mentality, some affinity to the “west” in terms of mutual, material interests is also “saleable” to American audiences. These considerations may seem mundane to ideologues and people motivated sincerely by high principles. But they ought not be dismissed cavalierly or contemptuously by any seeking a hearing for the commendable objective of winning American comprehension of the humanity of Arabs (or any other non-Americans) and for justice and equity in the deployment of American power, of all kinds. These are commendable, lofty purposes. The use by information-planners of such earthy but not unpalatable means for achieving them is entirely justifiable.

A second category of American interests which provides a context in which information programs should be conceived and implemented is the American people’s conception of itself (even if not always warranted) as a nation motivated by the best distillation of liberal, democratic ideals. Zionist-nationalism, in almost every respect is contrary to these same ideals. The opportunities to explore its true character are almost as extensive as the specifics of the Arab/Israel/Zionist conflict, on the one hand, together with the traditional aspiration of American Jews for acculturation, on the other hand. It is beyond the purview of this analysis to develop these categories in detail. But in deference to EAFORD’s declared, central purposes, contrasting Zionist nationalism’s values with the standards of a society in which race/religion neither enhances nor impairs any citizen’s full participation in that society’s system of rights and obligations should be a highly efficacious formula for offering an alternative to Zionism which can command general American support, including the support of American Jews. A *caveat* is again in order. Such an appeal should emphasize the historic, organic, functional racism/theocracy of Zionism, *as codified in Israeli law*. Exaggerations of isolated examples of discrimination which cannot be related to the Zionist/Israel legal/political system are probably,

on the whole, counter-productive. A good example of the importance of this proposition is the fairly recent altercation over the report on Israeli torture of Arabs made by the former United States diplomat, Ms Alexandra Johnson. The argument which ensued in the United States revolved not so much about Ms Johnson's stated facts as about her assertion that the practise of torture *seemed* to reveal a *pattern attributable to Israeli government policies*. Official efforts to water down Ms Johnson's findings questioned the asserted "pattern". Her report could have been strengthened had she prefaced it with a brief inventory of Israel's "basic" Zionist legislation such as "The Law of Return", the "Nationality Law" and the "'Status' Law". The Zionist bias in those laws makes the "practise" of torture of non-"Jewish people" Palestinians more credible to a world long brain-washed to believe Zionism is a liberal, humanitarian movement which could not possibly torture political dissidents.

Two other observations, briefly stated, may add practical value to this analysis.

1. There is definitely a tide of change rising now in American opinion. Most analysts of public opinion believe the change is more accurately described as a diminution of enthusiasm for Israel than as any positive, supportive position for "the Arabs". This suggests – or adds emphasis to – the necessity for anti-Zionist information to provide credible alternatives stated in the context of American interests and values.

2. Regardless of what knowledgeable experts may *know* about Zionism, there is a strong vestige of popular belief it is a well-meaning humanitarian, constructive movement. That mythology is sustained by the very extensive Zionist network which is expertly structured to spread "the Zionist word" throughout the country at a moment's notice and on any issue on which the Zionist managers decide such an orchestrated effort is in order.

To meet this apparatus with any degree of success now requires – in addition to good substance in the offered information – sufficient resources for mobilizing and coordinating the now rather significant numbers of Americans (individuals and some organizations) who seek justice for "the Arabs" and providing guidance for them to respond on every level where Zionist propaganda is activated.

This, in turn, requires easy accessibility to authoritative and where possible, official documentation of Arab policies and actions. It requires, also, greatly increased numbers of personnel who, by training and experience, know how to relate to the average American. The efficacy of these assets would undoubtedly be enhanced if, in addition, there were a central address to which interested Americans could turn for *promptly* delivered information. Such an agency, loosely coordinating the information effort, could also eliminate much present duplication of effort, some of which is of less than acceptable quality.

No miracles will result from any campaign even if it is based upon all, or

most of the information and recommendations of this analysis. But an effort, properly conceived in advance, provided with respectable resources, could rather quickly surface and mobilize a constituency in support of liberal, democratic specifics for coping with the problems that uninformed support of or acquiescence in Zionist propaganda programs have produced in the past for anti-Zionist (or even non-Zionist) Jews and Arabs, particularly Palestinians.

1. *The American Jewish Yearbook, 1979*, The American Jewish Committee, N.Y. The Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, Vol. 79, pp. 331-338, lists 67 organizations identified as "Zionist and Pro-Israel". The Yearbook is the most authoritative Baedeker through the maze of American "Jewish" organizations. Even this list does not include the United Jewish Appeal which is dominated by Zionist control.
2. See Alan Taylor, *Prelude to Israel*, The Institute for Palestine Studies, P.O. Box 7164, Beirut, Lebanon. See particularly, Chapters VI - VII, pp. 56ff.
3. State of Israel Bond Organization may now be added to these. Its primary function is the sale of State of Israel bonds. Its largest market is in the United States.
4. See, *Trial and Error*, The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann, Harper & Brothers, 1949, Chapter XXIII, pp. 315ff and XXVII, pp. 376ff.
5. *ibid*: p. 100
6. *Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel*, Herzl Press, McGraw-Hill, N.Y. 1979, Vol. I, p. 612
7. *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Inc., N.Y. 1942, Vol. 6 p. 92
8. *id*
9. See articles under United Jewish Appeal in *op. cit. Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, Vol. 10, p. 348 and *Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel*, Vol. 2, p. 1142.
10. For a detailed account of Zionist manipulations to create the United Jewish Appeal, see *The Political World of American Zionism*, Samuel Halperin, Wayne University Press, Detroit, Michigan 1961, pp. 195ff.
11. *Who Knows Better Must Say So*, Elmer Berger, The Bookmailer, 118 E. 28th St., N.Y. 10016, 1955, pp. 36ff.
12. The Peel Commission and later the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.
13. *op. cit. The Political world of American Zionism*, pp. 205ff.
14. Several individuals have taken the initiative to institute legal action against the United States Government, petitioning for a withdrawal of Federal Income-Tax deductibility for United Jewish Appeal contributions. The most consistent of these efforts is largely that of Mr Michael Bennett, President, International Seminars, Inc., 750 Hallowell Drive, Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania, 19006. Mr Bennett's most recent effort is an appeal-brief from the United States District Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, in 1979, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Copies of the brief may be obtained from Mr Bennett.
15. The most publicized of these potential actions was mentioned by President Eisenhower when Israel resisted withdrawal of its troops from Sinai following the tri-partite attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal in 1956.
16. *Suez, The Twice-Fought War*, Kennett Love, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y. 1969, p. 665.
17. *The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute "The Jewish People" Nationality entity and to Confer Membership In It: Appraisal in Public International Law*, W.T. Mallison, Jr., The George Washington Law Review, The George Washington University Law Center, Vol. 32 - June, 1965 - Number 5, pp. 105ff.
18. See Mallison's companion, sequential study: *The Legal Problems Concerning the Juridical Status and Political Activities of the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency*. A study in

International and United States Law. William and Mary Law Review, College of William and Mary, Volume 9, Spring 1968, Number 3.

19. *op. cit.*, Mallison's "William and Mary" study, pp. 598ff.

20. *Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel*, Ed. Joseph Badi, Tawyne Publishers, N. Y., 1961, p. 285.

21. See, *op. cit.* Mallison, William and Mary study, p. 626.

22. *ibid.*: p. 582.

23. See, "Problems of Palestinians in Israel", Land, work, Education, Adnan Abed Elrazik, Riyad Amin, Uri Davis, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Vol. VII, No. 3, Spring, 1978, pp. 31ff. Also, "The Arabs in Israel", Sabri Jiryis, 1973-79, *op. cit. Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, summer, 1979, pp. 31ff.; also, "Zionism and the Lands of Palestine", Sami Hadawi and Walter Lehn, *Zionism and Racism*, The International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, North American, Inc., New Brunswick, New Jersey, pp. 59ff., also, "I Will Remember the Land", Fouzi el-Asmar, translated from Hebrew by Uri Davis, American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, 133 East 73rd. Street, New York 10021; also, "A Letter from an American Rabbi to an Arab Ambassador", *The New York Times*, November 23, 1975, Section 4.

24. See, "Supplemental Statement", together with Appendices in Registration Statement No. 2278, filed September 30, 1971, U.S. Department of Justice files.

25. Criminal Case No. 40/61, In the District Court of Jerusalem, *Judgment*, December 11-12, 1961, p. 32 (unofficial translation).

26. Cited in full in *op. cit.* Mallison's study in George Washington Law Review, 1964, p. 1075.

27. See, "Zionist Role in U.S. Raises New Concern", Lawrence Mosher, *The National Observer*, Washington, D.C. May 18, 1970

28. *Hearing*, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 88th Congress, First Session, Parts 9 and 12. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963.

29. A rather comprehensive survey of the re-organization and the salient details are provided in a "Special Supplement" of *The Jerusalem Post*, Monday, June 21, 1971.

30. *Op. cit.* Supplement of *The Jerusalem Post*, p. 10.

31. *Id.*

32. *Id.* Supplement of *The Jerusalem Post*, p. 10.

33. *The Jewish News* (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Jerusalem) Newark, New Jersey, September 3, 1971, p. 11

34. *Op. cit.* *The Jewish News*, June 25, 1971, p. 1

35. An illustration of how the Zionist apparatus works is provided in *op. cit.*, *Hearings* (see note 28), pp. 1293-1301, 1339-1340; 1343-1348. At one point during the interrogation of Zionist witnesses, Senator Fulbright observed (p. 1311)

I don't know of any precedent of anything like it in any other instance, and I thought it would be interesting to the committee to understand how foreign agents in this particular field operate and what kind of principals they represent.

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